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At the dawn of the third millennium, humanity is increasingly aware that its 
traditional ethnocentric ethic is inadequate for the task of global 
sustainability. It is by now apparent that the contradictory requirements of 
physical nature, modern culture and human nurture, demand an evolving and 
dynamic homeostasis among all three existential realms.  
 Under the circumstances, traditional morality may seem too restricted in 
time and place to suffice in the interdependent and interacting world of the 
present and future. Yet, it is the fundamental axiom of this paper that 
updating, enlarging and readapting the classic cannon of ethics as a Modern 
Macro-Morality (M3) is the best way of resolving some of our planetary problems. 
In the Emerging Global Order (EGO) of the new millennium, renewed ethics will 
have to be applied in an ecumenical scale in order to harmonize both the 
potentiality and responsibility of humanity towards itself and its environment.  
 Building a holistic ethic can only be done by transcending local 
particularities and emphasizing global similarities, found in all great 
philosophies, ideologies and religions. A distillation of the essence of these 
ideas indicates the shared deontology of our species. These human universals are 
firmly rooted in the implicate order of things from which they draw their common 
heritage and to which they eventually return. 
 The primordial origin of this particular study is classic natural law as 
the eternal foundation of a renewed cosmopolitan ethic. This latest 
reinterpretation of ancient wisdom takes into account the recent advances of 
chaos and quantum theories as they have been worked out by the new paradigm of 
Sociophysics.  
 Upon this natural infrastructure, the study here adds the social 
superstructure to form a physics-ethics-politics (PEP) hypothesis, explicating 
the relationship among these three crucial variables. The resulting thesis 
elaborated here is that a New Cosmic Morality would consist of minimal 
principles of mutual consideration, applied to a maximal extent consistent with 
political moderation and natural evolution. 
 The study undertakes to define the concept, develop the process and decide 
the practice of ethics by posing nine critical questions and proposing their 
debatable answers. On the basis of this PEP discussion, a reformed theory of 
ethics could be elaborated eventually to serve the EGO of the new century.    
 
Paris Arnopoulos, 
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 At the dawn of the third millennium, the world is facing a plethora of 
mega-problems arising from the contraction of geography, the acceleration of 
history and the globalization of society. This unprecedented critical situation 
has been brought about primarily by many scientific innovations, whose 
technological applications revolutionized the world. Most important, behind the 
tremendous phenomena of political upheaval, economic development and cultural 
modernization experienced in the last couple of centuries lies the destruction 
of age-old traditions, including moral standards or ethical principles. 
 A fundamental prerequisite in trying to understand and resolve these 
existential problems is to discover the relation between thoughts and things: 
i.e. find the connection between moral values or ethical ideals and material 
reality or practical activity.  Assuming that ideas or ideals are important to 
acts or facts, how can they contribute to easing the social transition from one 
historical era into another? Can moral rethinking now help shape the Emerging 
Global Order (EGO) of the next century? Could a novel cosmic ethic be built for 
our EGO? 
 The definition and function of morality in human affairs has been debated 
since the dawn of history. Yet, the plethora of contrasting viewpoints boil down 
to a confrontation between subjective relativists and objective absolutists; the 
former recognizing different value systems coinciding with social boundaries and 
the latter abstracting a single underlying ethic for all humanity.  
 Based on these antecedents, this study attempts a conceptual clarification 
and practical application of ethics suitable for the EGO by synthesizing the 
antithetical positions of traditionalism and modernism, realism and idealism. As 
we see it, the present problem of conflicting and confusing morals demands a 
reexamination of fundamental principles to discover the common roots of our 
humanity in the context of an ecumenical ecology. 
 It is the central thesis of this work that the most feasible development 
of a modern macro-morality (m3), as the title indicates, must be based on the 
primordial standards of nature as elaborated by the world’s political system. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for such ethic require mutual 
consideration by consultation of the members of EGO, from individuals to 
nations. If these fundamental principles become acceptable by global consensus, 
the rest are technical rules to be resolved by the application of the general 
model in particular cases. 
 In its simplest terms, the model constructed here operates within the 
following three parameters: Physics (Nature, Cosmos, Viability); Ethics 
(Nurture, Logos, Morality); Politics (Culture, Nomos, Civility). This PEP frame 
trichotomizes our universe of discourse into the realms of physical nature, 
ethical nurture and political culture, whose fundamental principles are order 
and life, reason and value, rule and group. As elaborated later in the text, the 
common areas of these three central concepts represent the post-Aristotelian 
nova magna moralia thesis proposed in this study.  
 The emphasis of the model is placed upon the trilateral relations of these 
domains by proposing the optimal application of a modern global morality through 
a combination of physics, politics and ethics. Physics because nature is the 
underlying context of global existence, politics because culture is the highest 
creation of human evolution, and ethics because it provides the conjunction 
between the other two. Consequently, neo-macro-morals takes into account 
ecology, ethology and sociology. 
 To demonstrate this thesis, our method combines the four Aristotelian 
causes with the W5 (who, what, where, when, why) journalistic questions by 
reformulating his material, formal, efficient and final causes as what, how, who 
and why of ethics. To these, for the sake of completeness, we have added five 




by answering these questions as correctly as possible, one can explain a subject 
matter as completely as possible.  
 This study then approaches our topic by attempting to answer these key 
questions in a systemic and systematic way. Each of these intersects and 
involves our three domains, thereby accentuating their interrelations. The 
answers should provide the basis for an adequate understanding of the concept, 
content and context of ethics, its structural-functional dynamics and global 
strategic applications at the turn of this century.  
 The study’s three chapters elaborate on each of these aspects. The first 
sets the stage of our inquiry by constructing a working structural definition of 
ethics. The second follows the natural evolution of value systems and contrasts 
the philosophical debates on this subject. Finally, the third attempts a 
strategic application of the results of the previous two by calculating the 





 We begin by defining “ethics” as the code of “considerate human conduct.” 
This working definition forms a conceptual system composed of the following 
tridimensional framework: 
-A set of codes guiding action or behavior in a normative (considerate) manner. 
-A group of (human) subjects capable of acting by following these codes.  
-A stage of activity within which players perform (conduct) their roles. 




 Ethics has been defined as the systematic analysis and validation of 
value-laden concepts concerning questions of right-wrong, good-evil, permitted-
forbidden. Within this range of dual polarities, ethics may be seen as a 
conceptual system of imperative propositions containing certain guides to 
action, rules of behavior, or codes of conduct. As such, it is concerned only 
with interpersonal or inter-group relations  
 Ethics may be considered as an algorithmic model or cybernetic mechanism 
that regulates some operations by channeling them within certain predetermined 
orientations. In that sense, it is a set of principles directing acts in a 
particular way based on criteria of goodness, righteousness and propriety. Thus, 
ethical standards distinguish desirable from deplorable behavior and required 
from forbidden acts. 
 As a guide, ethics proposes a categorical trinity according to which all 
moral actions fall within a negative-neutral-positive axis, along which they may 
be prohibited, condemned, avoided, tolerated, permitted, obliged, or applauded.  
In this continuum, ethics cannot be an “either-or” proposition, but extends in 
various degrees between a minimax range of intermediate acceptability. Thus 
between extremely revolting acts or those supererogated above and beyond the 
call of duty, there are certain minimal rules of acceptable conduct which form 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for any ethical code. 
 It is this sine qua non upon which we focus here by formally defining 
ethics as the “considerate conduct code.”  The whole corpus of such code is 
based on the primordial principle of conviviality: i.e. peaceful and pleasant 
coexistence of interrelated and interacting beings of different opinions and 
positions. Accordingly, an act is ethical if and only if it takes into 
consideration those it affects. By consideration is meant the deliberate regard, 
conscious concern, reflective respect a subject displays when taking into 
account the object of an act.   




order to qualify as ethics. Love is an emotional experience that does not 
necessarily depend on free will, so it can neither be controlled nor legislated 
as morality. Thus, acts motivated by love, force or instinct lie beyond the pale 
of ethics and may be considered amoral.  
 With this minimalistic content as our basic scenario, it is only necessary 
to assume the existence of ethic-prone beings who interact in a systemic 
context. Assuming the existence of a script, the operative requirements for 
ethics to be performed are capable players and a proper stage. These conditions 





 The existence of ethics as guide of action presumes someone who obeys 
them. Moreover, it assumes the possibility and actuality of choice by its 
subjects who must have potential choices, as well as be able to make decisions.  
 In saying that, we classify all acts or events in three categories: 
deterministic, voluntaristic and randomistic. According to this taxonomy, ethics 
falls primarily under the middle category, thus requiring intentional behavior, 
rather than externally imposed causality or inadvertent chance. This distinction 
provides the first criterion of exclusivity, leaving out of ethical potentiality 
all inanimate objects, since their actions are either programmatic or erratic. 
 That exclusion lets only organisms to be the sole candidates of ethics to 
the extent that they intend what they do. Ethology extends some degree of 
intentional behavior in animals, so we must accept a modicum of natural ethics 
operating in the biosphere. Nature programs certain internal code of ethics or 
innately considerate behavior in all life and particularly some intentional 
behavior in higher or rational animals. 
  Nevertheless, full intentionality is only reached in the human species as 
the paragon of animals. As such, humans are strictly speaking ethical animals 
par excellence because they are the most self-conscious and hence conscientious 
creatures. As Aristotle said, men alone posses ethekai aretai or moral virtues. 
If that proposition is accepted, humans are the ethical protagonists who can and 
do control somewhat their behavior according to given options. Ethics thus apply 
primarily to adults who can judge and be judged responsible for their choices. 
 As social animals, humans make decisions both individually and 
collectively, so ethics applies to all levels of social aggregation. Nations and 
corporations as well as natural and moral persons are potential principals of 
ethical conduct. In this sense, societies, states or other groups cannot escape 
collective responsibility for actions decided by consensus and carried out by 
their designated agents. 
  Whether they act on their own or on behalf of others, humans are the 
ultimate instigators of ethical conduct, so they must be held responsible for 
all activities involving others. Similarly, when someone else is acting on one’s 
instructions, the principal incurs joint responsibility. Obviously elected 
politicians or appointed functionaries are mutually responsible along with their 
electors and appointees for their collective actions.  
 As a result, and for all practical purposes, only mature humans, severally 
or collectively, are moral agents who may be evaluated and must be accountable 
for their actions affecting others. Who those others are then is the next 
question whose answer depends on another criterion of inclusion.  
 From what has been said above, that criterion is life. But since organic 
membership extends from the most primitive to the most sophisticated, realism 
must allow of several classes of citizenship from the least to the most ethical. 
On the basis of the principle of reciprocity, the main line of inclusion is 
hereby drawn around the human species. Since people are the foremost subjects of 




 Considerate treatment becomes a fundamental human right as it is a duty, 
so everyone should not only act morally, but expect to be treated in such way. 
Thus, our social context radiates outwards from the actor in widening concentric 
circles, from the most exclusive nuclear family and close kin, to friends and 
neighbors, comrades and colleagues, cohorts and compatriots, to include the 
entire human species and even beyond to all forms of life. 
  This means that people have an obligation to treat all life with some 
consideration. Although humans are the principal subjects of ethics, they are 
not its only objects. Non-human life partakes somewhat of ethics and so falls 
under its scope as well.   
 The main criterion of ethical involvement to apply here is that of 
concern. That is to say, an ethical actor is required to be considerate only to 
those concerned. But since concern is not an either-or proposition but admits of 
many gradations, it is better to say that the degree of consideration by the 
subject is proportional to the level of concern by the object. That is why those 




 The question as to who has ethical rights or duties and therefore must 
perform its obligations or may enjoy its privileges, leads us to the question 
where does the scope of ethics extends. Obviously those who fall within its 
domain may partake of ethics, whereas those excluded are beyond it. One thus 
should be careful where the lines are drawn and who belongs in each class. 
 Let us here draw the first line of separation around society, defined as 
an organic system whose members share certain characteristics. Some common 
traits are necessary to support ethics by providing the context of their 
operation. In this sense, animal societies may be said to possess some 
rudimentary ethics, although these do not reach their maturity until humanity. 
 From this central rule, we derive our basic topological postulate that 
makes society the primary context of ethics. As a code of conduct, ethics only 
involves social interactions rather than internal thoughts or isolated acts. 
Solitary processes, whether mental or material, are thus ethically irrelevant, 
because they can neither be known by others nor involve them directly.  
 Identifying society as the central context of morality requires more 
specificity as to its content. It is well appreciated that there are various 
kinds of social structures, from small to large and from the simple to the 
complex. Traditional morality circumscribes its jurisdiction to the extended 
family, clan or tribe and at most nation. Beyond is the terra incognita of 
nature where the law of the jungle holds sway. 
  Such precipitous cascade might have been helpful and practicable in the 
past; but in an increasingly interdependent world, they appear less and less 
relevant. The EGO presently dismantles boundaries of every kind and thus demands 
an extension of morality into wider circles embracing all people, if not all 
life.  
  But as it broadens the scope, it swallows the depth of ethical 
commitment. The degree of consideration one gives to others correlates with 
proximity and propinquity. Obviously, one’s closest cohorts and neighbors get 
more attention and compassion than far away peoples or generations. The strength 
of ethical concern is proportional to history, geography and geneology. Such 
discrimination is unavoidable in an imperfect world of value scarcity, so some 
ethical selectivity must be accepted as a fact of life. 
 At this point, it is necessary to clarify our usage of the terms “ethics” 
and “morals”. Although these may be used as equivalent concepts, it is useful to 
draw a fine distinction between them. On the basis of their etymology, ethics is 
derived from the Greek natural ethos and morals from the Latin social mores.  As 




whereas the latter is its sub-set containing merely cultural life unique to 
humanity.  Thus, only human beings are subjects of morality, whereas all living 
organisms are objects of ethics. 
 As a cultural artifact –-taxis--, morality does not exist in a state of 
natural order –-cosmos--, but only within human society. This explains the 
relationship between morality and civility, since the latter is behavior that 
makes high density living of humans not only tolerable but also desirable. 
Hence, sociability is akin to urbanity, civility and polity, not only 
etymologically, but also existentially. For this reason Aristotle praised social 
morality as the virtue of decency. 
  Since then, there is a continuing debate as to the distinction between 
natural and cultural virtues. We herein take a rather Humean position by 
affirming that although ethics is based on nature, it is largely a human 
cultivation. In this hypothesis, nature provides the independent parameters upon 
which culture builds its depend variables, and thus serves to explain them. It 
is on the basis of genetic and inherent givens that we can develop sentimental 
and intellectual moral faculties. In human terms, nature is quod semper, quod 
ubique, quod omnibus.  
 Although human ethics are rooted to their natural sources, they can and 
often do deviate from them.  Morals go a step further by their contextual 
cultural specificity. As a result, it may be said that morality is a creature of 
human nurture that synthesizes the contradictions between nature and culture. As 
such the two terms -ethics and morals- are often used synonymously. 
 This interpretation means that nature may be ethical but is amoral. 
Natural facts or events, such as the unequal distribution of energy and material 
resources, including human talents, need no moral justification. How humans deal 
with such facts, however, does fall under moral scrutiny. Those things which 
conform to our natural constitution or character are considered valuable, so 
advancing them is moral. Morality is thus an artificial construct devised by 
humans to guide situational behavior within certain mutually acceptable 
channels. As such, it is somewhat arbitrary because it depends on many cultural 
differences as well as various environmental distinctions. 
 With these variables in mind, it may be said that ethics apply in varying 
degree to all interactions in three levels of increasing aggregation: 
-Micro (interpersonal): among individuals, within the same community. 
-Meso (international): among different societies and human cultures. 
-Macro (interbiotical): among living beings, between humanity and other species. 
 These levels have been recognized since classical times as those of: jus 
civilis, jus gentium, and jus naturalis.  As one moves from the inner circle of 
exclusive moral jurisdiction to the outer circle of inclusive ethical 
membership, the strength and depth of normative principles lessens and weakens. 
The quality of ethics is thus inversely correlated to the quantity of its 
contents.  
 It is for that reason that the quantitatively maximal social ethics can 
only rely on the qualitative minimal natural laws and vice versa. Since nature 
is all-inclusive, its ethos boils down to the lowest common denominator, whereas 
culture’s exclusivity allows higher variability and complexity. Consequently, a 
global morality has to and only needs to consist of simple standards in order to 
ensure an adequate ethical behavior among species, states and peoples. 
 The above brief exposition of the content, subject and context of ethics 
has posed the questions of what is it, who practices it, and where it happens. 
The given answers of consideration, humanity and society, establish our 










  Having completed the relatively static aspects of our ethical system, we 
now proceed to describe its more dynamic ones. From conceptual structure then, 
we move to historical process from the past to the present and eventual future 
of our subject matter, thus answering questions of whence, when and why. Since 
humans are temporal as well as territorial creatures, we must also cover the 
time, as we did the space dimension of our reality.  
 The three sections of this chapter treat issues involving temporal 
variables, proceeding from the emergence of ethics in human consciousness to its 




 The distinction made above between ethics and morals reflects the 
dichotomy between natural and cultural standards. So, in order to discover 
whence ethics arose, we have to revert to its natural origins. Since, we 
postulated the absence of morals in non-human life and accept the theory of 
evolution, we must conclude that morality arose somewhere along human 
development from instinctive to intentional behavior. 
  The evolutionary tendency for homeostatic centralization and systemic 
complexification that reached its peak in the corticalization of man, also had 
as a byproduct the cultural differentiation of the species. According to the 
criterion of hierarchy, moral responsibility correlates directly with systemic 
complexity, therefore human evolution has accumulated not only reason and 
intelligence, but auto-consciousness and etho-conscience.  
 This ability for introspection and intention evolved homo sapiens beyond 
its singular natural state by creating different cultural systems. As a social 
animal, man's empathy for community is instinctive and so provides the context 
for human action as described above. But, as mankind diverged from a common 
natural origin to separate cultural communities, a natural pan-human ethos was 
supplemented by several social mores.  
 These separate cultural developments went on in tandem for millennia, thus 
solidifying the distinctions among human societies. This gradual expansion and 
differentiation of the species contributed to a flowering of many distinct 
cultures, enriching humanity but also creating conflicting standards of 
morality. These contradictions characterize human cultures, with both their 
advantages and disadvantages. 
 We are here concerned mainly with the disadvantages that are becoming 
increasingly evident as the world becomes more interdependent. When cultures 
were isolated from each other, their differences could be ignored.  But with the 
break down of space-time barriers by modern modes of transportation and 
communication, intercultural contacts are fraught with increasing frictions and 
conflicts. 
  Presently, as all cultures become subsumed or submerged in the nascent 
global super culture, their contradictions must be resolved to the extent 
necessary for peaceful coexistence. Our thesis is that such resolution is to be 
found in the common sense buried deeply within human nature. That is the only 
foundation shared by all human cultures. It is therefore upon that rock where a 
universal ethic can and must be built. 
  As much as humanity has moved away from nature, its roots always cling in 
the soil.  Since the genesis of human ethics lie buried in the natural ethos of 
all life, our task is to discover the hidden similarities of cultural morals in 
natural ethics. Thus, in order to find the ethical commonalities underlying 
moral particularities, one has to find the singularity of natural infrastructure 
supporting a plurality of social structures. Searching for the natural origins 




Astonishing Hypothesis. According to it, both conscience and consciousness are 
functions of human biology and may be located in a definite area of the brain. 
In that case, ethics is deeply rooted in the human soul and manifests itself in 
normal social behavior within every culture. 
 Similarly, Lebensphilosophie, a modern bioethical theory, considers moral 
codes and religious myths as nature's way of compensating humans for their loss 
of innocence and instinct. Accordingly, homo sapiens is a degenerating species, 
needing culturally produced moral prosthetics to make up for the degradation of 
its biological autonomic means of self-defense.  Evolutionary progress then is 
an anti natural process directing humans away from their original autonomic 
organism towards a contrived artificial mechanism.  
 Finally, according to the latest theory of sociophysics, human evolution 
reflects life’s negentropic tendency towards innovation and differentiation. 
History records this as a struggle among competing values such as equality, 
security, harmony, liberty and individuality. Social morality supplements 
natural ethics in trying to attenuate this dynamic conflict by channeling it 
within acceptable and recognizable patterns. 
 Whether it is social development from primitive tribal moralism to 
sophisticated cosmopolitan ethics or the mind's spiritual leap from natural 
selection to self-conscious direction, evolution may be seen as nature's 
experimental way of increasing our chances of survival. Either way, we are a 
part of nature, not apart from it. On that basis, man is primus inter pares with 





 Based on the above evolutionary presentation, we are now ready to consider 
the circumstances under which ethics is practiced. The question is when do moral 
issues become relevant in human behavior? In order to answer this question, one 
enters the age-old debate between universal and situational ethics. Those who 
support the former thesis assert the timelessness, as well as spacelessness, of 
ethical principles; whereas the latter antithesis counters precisely the 
contrary. 
 This philosophical debate began with the Sophist dichotomy between physis 
and nomos: the first containing the natural, eternal and universal laws of 
ethical conduct and the second the cultural, historical and local customs of 
social morality. The distinction drew the battle lines between the idealists or 
rationalists and the realists or relativists which goes back to Plato's episteme  
(formal knowledge) versus Aristotle's phronesis  (practical wisdom). The 
latter’s ethike arete, meaning character excellence, becomes virtuous only when 
it is coupled with the will for phronesis, thus it is to be preferred as more 
realistic than the former’s utopian models.  
  Throughout the various cycles of this debate, the Natural Law school 
dominated the mainstream classical thought from Stoic cosmopolitanism to the 
grand medieval Thomistic synthesis and beyond it to Grotian internationalism, 
until its triumphant proclamation of human rights and liberal constitutionalism 
in the age of Enlightenment.  
 This Natural Law tradition is not confined solely to Western culture. It 
also developed in African, Judaic, Islamic, Hindu, Confucian and Buddhist ideas 
by distinguishing between absolute, stable, static, universal norms and 
relative, mutable, dynamic, local laws. Apart from their super structural 
details, the infrastructural foundations of all these approaches are equivalent 
and their ethical aphorisms are strikingly similar. 
  Continuing in the same vein, modern thought emphasized absolute standards 
of formalism and decontextualized episteme without taking into account doxa. 




Searching for a novus ordo rerum or mundo, as we are, Natural Law thinkers from 
Thomists to Marxists, all sought and found suprapersonal and super cultural 
standards to guide human conduct. 
  Recently however, there has been another return to more traditional 
thinking along the lines of Pyrrho’s skepticism and Erasmus’s humanism. Although 
these thinkers recognized that the human condition depends on nostre maitre, la 
nature, as Montaign put it, they questioned the absolutism of natural law. Going 
even further, the culturalists like Moore affirmed that basing morals on nature 
is a naturalistic fallacy: a road to nowhere.  
 Similarly, Levy-Srauss’ anthropological tribalism emphasized traditional 
superstitions based on time and place as the roots of social morality. In 
parallel, Sartre concurred that there is no such thing as human nature, everyone 
is doomed to shape one’s own existence. Finally, Foucault rejected a single 
universal ethic as both unnecessary and undesirable, preferring instead a 
plurality of cultural morals. As Camus and Merlo-Ponti stressed, human life can 
never be free of moral ambiguities and absurdities, so there is no point 
searching for absolute logical standards. 
 The present transition to post modernity repeats another cycle from 
fundamentalism to universalism and back again. Accordingly, post modernism 
denies any general principles and seeks to deconstruct morality in an anti-
rationalistic manner. Permanent avant-gardism and meta-existentialism become its 
new forms of life. This virtual instead of virtuous reality is the vitalistic 
neo-Nietzschean inspiration of French post-structuralists from Foucault to 
Leotard, as well as the German hermeneutic neo-Aristotelianism of Wittgenstein 
and Godamer.  
 These neopragmatic-metaphoric narrative ethology and moral psychology of 
communitarianism are like sedentary versions of Enlightenment criticism. 
Nevertheless, they are well taken as serious attempts to tolerate, if not 
understand, the human condition. Our intention then is not to accept in toto one 
side or the other, but look for eclectic complementarities in both.  
 In doing so, we admit Hume’s aphorism that value judgments cannot be 
logically inferred from factual statements and that ethical principles differ 
from physical laws because morals involve subjective human liberum arbitrium 
that objective laws do not. Yet, whether we like it or not quaestio iuris  
(cognitive or moral validity) cannot be completely divorced from quaestio facti  
(historical or cultural relativity).  
 If the search for universal objectivity is not to lead to infinite regress 
or circular tautology, it must rest its Archimedian fulcrum on a given base, be 
it rational or mystical. In this option, scientific criteria of epistemology are 
ultimately no better grounded than ethical criteria of axiology. Both truth and 
right require a metaphysical foundation upon which to stand. The ultimate 
indeterminacy or human logic must therefore be accepted with equanimity and 
creativity.  
 Both transcendental theologies and secular ideologies are such primordial 
creative human constructs, providing a creed, code and cult as the basis to 
validate moral values as well as empirical claims. Catholics and communists, 
utilitarians and libertarians, find general principles reflected in such pithy 
dicta as the Christian sermon parable, Kantian categorical imperative or the 
Benthamite felicific calculus. So, scientism, positivism or naturalism may be 
seen as those ideological beliefs that posit a certain connection between 
natural laws and moral codes through the evolution of ethics from animal ethos 
to human morals. 
 These theories propose that a basic fact of human life is that people hold 
various values and desire many goods that are mutually exclusive and 
irreducible, thus clashing with each other at different paces and places.  It is 
under these conditions that people engaged in moral debates.  Whenever human 




concerns and public affairs. Moral considerations thus involve the impact one’s 
actions have on others. 
  To escape the resulting ethical dilemmas, most people accept an absolute 
dogma that relieves them of personal responsibility, even at the price of moral 
mutilation. For that reason, most ethical standards are still culture specific 
and vary according to time and space: what is acceptable in a particular period 
or region is not in others. This is especially so in international affairs where 
problems exist not only from material conflicts of interest but ideological 
clashes of opinion.  
 In order to resolve these inter region and inter period differences, 
philosophers and politicians alike still search for a common basis of pan-human 
ethics. To this end, International Scholars Annual Trialogue (ISAT) joins 
Jewish-Christian-Muslim intellectuals in a continuing attempt to determine a 
global ethic. In the same vein, Universalists and Futurists have undertaken 
comparative, interdisciplinary studies of the psychology, sociology, ecology and 
theology of human values and could come up with the basis of a universal ethical 
code. 
 Upon such hard rock of general principles of global legitimacy may be 
found the particular situational or culture bound morals of specific content and 
limited extent. Whatever these may be, they can hardly support antipathetic and 
mutually exclusive ways of life in constant friction at the close quarters of 
the “global village.” It is then to be expected that a common morality is bound 
to emerge as the present convergent trends continue into the foreseeable future. 
 Disagreements about what is ethical are fairly common wherever people do 
not share strong bonds of communal traditions. Only tightly knit and homogeneous 
communities succeed in establishing and maintaining such ethical consensus, 
resulting from similar opinions. 
 If the world is by now a single social system: gesellschaft, it is by no 
means a global community: gemeinschaft. The galloping economic integration of 
the planet is now far ahead of its political confederation, let alone cultural 
homogenization. It is this heterogeneity which presents ethical controversies 
pitting millions of people against each other. 
 These ethical confrontations arise from the necessity to build a common 
social structure without having a single cultural infrastructure. As a result, 
the global social system is now a hodge-podge of ad hoc institutions tenuously 
interconnected by ties of economic interdependence with few mutual feelings of 
common interest.  
 The contemporary global social system is a result of economic and 
political necessity, rather than of cultural empathy. The different aspects of 
social life and natural existence are therefore out of step in this uneven 
process of development. The task is to synthesize and synchronize them before it 




 We need not enter here into the debate between deontological and 
teleological ethics in order to determine the whither and why of morality. 
Rather, we take a functional outlook which assigns utility in the difference 
ethics make in ordinary life. As form follows function, so morality provides the 
ideal means serving practical ends. The purpose of ethics is to promote a 
cooperative coexistence in convivial and congenial community.  
 As their natural instincts atrophied, humans supplemented genes with 
memes. These latter contain the collective cumulative memories of their culture 
and serve as guides to acceptable conduct. Such guides, whether genetic or 
memetic, are absolutely necessary to avoid random or arbitrary behavior 
resulting in social chaos. Ethics, like instincts, set common standards of 




interpersonal or international interactions comparable and predictable.  
 Beyond the necessary function of social coherence, ethics also promotes 
social harmony by setting the margins of legitimate behavior to the optimal 
permissiveness at any particular time or place. Contextual ethics takes into 
account environmental factors that set the perimeter of social conduct. Ideally, 
ethics sets the rules for a positive-sum game in which all participants could 
win something. 
  Of course, the rewards depend on various factors that do not always favor 
everyone equally. As such, some people deny or deform the rules thus getting 
particular advantages and privileges. Unethical behavior can thus pay dividends, 
as long as it is limited to few covert instances. If immorality becomes widespread 
and public corruption sets-in the body politic, then the social system decays, as 
was the case with the decline and fall of so many civilizations.  
 Seen from an ecological perspective, ethology, like technology, has 
favored culture at the expense of nature. As humanity dominated the earth, it 
exploited and extinguished many other organisms. By doing so, however, it 
undermines its own means of survival. If for no other reason, human sustenance 
requires some consideration for other life forms whose existence provides the 
wherewithal for our food.  The diminishing returns the overwhelming success 
story of humanity points out the necessity for new ethic as well as new technic 
of sustainable development. The function of neoethics is thus to restrain human 
conduct for its own good, not only toward itself but more important towards all 
of nature which is indispensable for our life. 
 Here it is necessary to reemphasize the distinction between fundamental 
ethics and superficial morals. The former are necessary to any society and are 
ubiquitous in all cultures, whereas the latter are optional under certain 
conditions and thus unique to particular ones. Moral relativity corresponds to 
the latter kind and reflects the situation when what was considered abnormal 
then or there may become acceptable here or now. In this case we are concerned 
with fundamental ethics that must necessarily be universal and eternal. These 
infrastructural principles are neither numerous nor mysterious. As defined 
above, they are procedural rather than substantive and set the minimal 
conditions for social relations and civil behaviour. 
  The neoethics defined here abhors arbitrary and unilateral action which 
may be permissible in isolated conditions of extra social conduct, but is 
dysfunctional and destructive under systemic situations of high density where 
the world finds itself at present. This applies equally to individuals as to 
states, since the latter are presently becoming as interdependent as the former.  
 These new conditions now demand as ethical a conduct from nations as from 
people in order to optimize the mutual benefits derived from stability and 
reciprocity. Thus the principle of pacta sunt servanta is now generally 
applicable as a moral as well as a legal obligation underlying all conventions 
which set expectations of reciprocal reliability provided rebus sic stantibus. 
 Beyond interpersonal morality or international legality, the minimax 
character of neoethics reflects its all-inclusive simplicity. By restraining 
human actions towards both natural and social environments, it actually promotes 
sustainable human development. Ecoethics is therefore based on the enlightened 
self-interest of anthropocentrism rather than on any charitable moralism or 
idealistic altruism.  
 With these considerations, we close the discussion on ethical dynamics in 
its historical, situational and potential components. Having done so, we 
answered the questions of whence, when, and why of ethics by finding its origins 
in natural law, its timing in extra personal concerns, and its raison d’etre in 
promoting community compassion. These answers allow us to understand the 
necessity and desirability of “considerate conduct” both towards fellow human 




3.  APPLICATION 
 
 We have now arrived at the final phase of this study by attempting to 
apply morality in our EGO. To do so, we pose the questions of how to practice 
ethics, how much it costs, and whether there are any alternatives to it. In 
these questions, we search for methods, costs, and options to ethical policies, 
so that we are able to decide if ethics is the optimal means for human survival 
and progress. The following sections attempt to provide some preliminary answers 




 As a start, we propose that the essence of ethics is not substantive but 
procedural. Accordingly, moral conduct is judged not in what it does but by how. 
This requirement makes form much more relevant than substance: the modus 
operandi or the rules of engagement become crucial to the ethical significance 
of an act. 
 It is not the many codes of right and wrong, good and bad, do’s and 
don’ts, but the singular way they are performed, which is constant in all 
ethical systems. For that reason we don’t have to go into the plethora of rules 
and regulations, so we can concentrate in the simple modality of morality.  
Ethical universals and perennials remain at the core of life, after moral 
specifics and temporals are peeled away from its periphery. Thus the general 
method enunciated here may be considered as the lowest common denominator of 
several higher nominators.  
 So much so that ethics itself was herein formally defined in terms of its 
unique procedure: i.e. “considerate conduct”. In that sense, ethical behavior 
demands that actors take into account those who might be affected by their 
actions. This primary imperative of consideration means that ethics assumes 
thinking before acting. Inconsiderate and insensitive acts are therefore at 
least amoral, if not unethical. 
 Although a modicum of ethics is genetic in all life, thoughtfulness is a 
characteristic centered around conscience, therefore it can only be experienced 
by self-conscious beings. Consequently, we defined ethics as an organic 
inclusivity and morals as a human exclusivity. As such, unlike ethics, morality 
is autonomic rather than automatic and excludes accidental or congenital 
behavior.  
 Beyond the instinctive level, the question is how does one practice 
ethics? Common sense tells us that when those involved in social interactions 
are normal adults, the best way to exercise consideration is by consultation. 
Moral beings must thus consult with those concerned before they undertake any 
social activity. 
 It is the consent of the affected that makes an act explicitly ethical, 
because it is the sufferer and not the perpetrator, who should judge its 
morality. Consent is thus the best and simplest way to evaluate the morality of 
an act.  As such, any activity concerning consenting adults is moral per se.  
  Inter human killing, for example, is immoral only if it is done without 
the prior consent of the victim. But since any organic survival requires some 
eating, which means killing of other species, it is merely amoral; but ethical 
nonetheless, as long as it does not deprive others in the food chain by wasting 
and depleting scarce resources. Obviously, no eater gets consent from its food, 
but natural ethos is perfectly exhibited in the sustainable life cycle of a 
balanced ecosystem. 
  Since consultation and consent among humans requires a dialogue, 
communication is the operational index measuring consideration. Thanks to their 
sophisticated linguistic capabilities, people can discuss potential actions 





 When anyone who cannot be consulted may be affected by some action, the 
burden of proof still remains with the actor. It is the subjects of ethical 
actions, who must take into account the position or opinion of their objects, be 
they social or natural, even if the latter are not able to express it. In these 
cases, noblesse oblige exacts of ourselves a bit more than we expect from 
others, especially when they, as children or animals, are not in a position to 
reciprocate. 
 Of course, being considerate neither means ignoring one’s own position nor 
sacrificing self-interest for the sake of others. Although, ethics cannot be 
purely egoistic, neither does it have to be entirely altruistic. Rather, it is 
actually found somewhere between the egoism-altruism continuum as a realistic 
golden mean that avoids both ideal extremes.  
 From such equilibrium between moral polarities emerges the notion of 
equity that evolved into the concept of justice. In this context, ethics is the 
basic manifestation of equitable behavior and fair dealing because it tries to 
balance various interests and find their proper place and just milieu.  
 Similarly, ethics manifests itself in responsible conduct to the extent 
that it is responsive to the needs of others and is thereby accountable for its 
actions. Ethical responsibility accrues by considered judgment to bona fide acts 
after due deliberation and careful calibration. 
 Since reciprocity is a fundamental principle of coexistence, mutuality is 
used here as a basic criterion of social morality. Such reciprocity is reflected 
both in the Classical, Confucian, and Christian Golden Rule: treat others as you 
wish to be treated. Yet, adequate as this rule is, one should try to go a step 
further and treat others as they wish to be treated. Consequently, we may 
paraphrase the classic imperative as “do unto others what others want done unto 
them” thereby making it our highest ethical ideal.   
 
3.2. COST  
 
Like everything else of value, ethics incur some costs. The benefits of 
ethical behavior outlined above come with a certain price. So, valuable as 
ethics is, it must be balanced against other values which often outweigh it. It 
is by no means our position here that ethics is the summum bonum of human 
ideals, nor does it necessarily place at the top of one’s priorities. Like 
everything else, how much is morality worth depends on the wider context which 
determines its comparative exchange rate. 
  In this utility calculus of ethical advantages versus disadvantages, the 
decision-maker may have to compromise ethics in order to attain some other 
desirable end. In the real world, such ethical compromises and tradeoffs are 
understandable and unavoidable phenomena. Often, morality is a luxury that 
necessity cannot afford, so less than moral behavior where survival is at stake 
should not be judged too harshly. Nevertheless, it should be recognized as such, 
so people realize their imperfections and try to minimize them even if it goes 
against their instinctive reactions. 
 It is quite evident that some unethical behavior confers certain immediate 
profit, advancing one’s self-interests. As long as immorality is contained 
within a few whose identity is unknown, they can derive an unfair advantage over 
the moral masse. The carrying capacity of social systems can normally absorb 
such exceptional cases and survive. As the famous saying goes: one can fool all 
the people for some time or some people all time, but not all people all the 
time! 
 The opportunism of unethical conduct is therefore ephemeral and eventually 
exacts a heavy price when reprisals cancel out its temporary advantages. The 
modicum of ethics as defined here is thus always the general rule that is 




 Endowed with reason and conscience and free to choose good or evil, humans 
must accept responsibility for their choices. Yet, in spite of what they choose, 
they should be treated with certain respect and consideration. Human dignity 
imposes duties and obligations, as well as rights and privileges towards an 
increasingly inclusive context. This context has now become global in every 
sense, thus ethics must expand to embrace the whole planet. So, it is our thesis 
here that as humanity goes forth and multiply its members and powers, it needs 
to become more ethical and less liberal. As it becomes more potent, it requires 
greater self-constraint and acquires heavier responsibilities.  
 Yet, modern morality developed such an extraordinary respect for human 
life and freedom that its vaulting ambitions expanded into wretched excess. This 
overemphasis has resulted in unrequited rising expectations and unprecedented 
population explosions which like a locust is spreading all over the Earth and 
devours everything in its path. Thus humanity has broken its contract with Gaia 
by upsetting the rerum naturae.  
 If this human hubris does not destroy itself along with its natural 
environment, a global reformulation of natural ethics is long overdue. 
Accordingly, neoethics must not overprice human life by undervaluing other forms 
of existence. As things stand now, the birth of another child is much more 
costly to the ecosystem, than the death of another animal. It follows that it 
would be more ethical for a man to plant a tree than to sire a baby.  
 However, since liberty is proportional to ability, intention and 
opportunity, ethical freedom of choice depends on many factors, most of which 
the ordinary person may neither control nor afford. It is because the price of 
morality is often too high for the average man that it should neither be made 
unnecessarily expensive nor narrowly exclusive. As such, moderation is the 
cornerstone of practical morality.  
 In order to avoid the costly extremities of utopian idealism, a realistic 
global ethic can only be a simple code of light cost that fits the low moral and 
material budget of humanity. Such budget must be based on a “balance of 
principle” which cannot allow any value or ideal, no matter how desirable it may 
seem, to dominate our normative system.  
 Since ethics is only one of many human values, morality continuously 
competes with such rivals as liberty and security for its proper place in the 
normative pantheon. Since a general value hierarchy is impossible to get 
universally accepted, ethics cannot claim absolute supremacy over the others. It 
must therefore accommodate itself with its competitors in a dynamic equilibrium.   
  Moreover, at this point of human evolution, any moral imperative can only 
be a moderate one, since the cost of anything more extravagant surpasses the 
moral sensibilities of most people towards an all-inclusive scope. Since the 
world is not a community, its moral absorptive capacity is limited, therefore it 
cannot be overburdened with very high ethical standards.  
 The minimalist approach of liberal standards fits sufficiently well here 
to improve the actual situation without unrealistic expectations. Emphasizing 
the priority of proper means over good ends is eminently moral because it 
promotes moderation and toleration as the best way to exorcise human freedom 
within necessary limitations. Moreover, it is the only way that civilized life 
can carry on in a multicultural world where peaceful coexistence is a necessity, 
if not a reality. 
 
3.3. OPTION 
   
From the above discussion, it would seem that although a moral cost-
benefit calculation may go either way in particular cases, it is generally 
favorable to ethics. So, whether morality is worth its price or cost at any 
particular time and place, depends on the alternatives presented.  




human dilemma is having to choose among competing and contradicting values such 
as liberty versus security. Since these values cannot all be maximized at once, 
each one can only be increased at the expense of another. Opting to become more 
ethical inevitably means sacrificing some other values thus foregoing other 
options. 
 The criteria of selection depend on one’s priorities that may change 
according to circumstances. For humanity as a whole, however, it seems that 
ethics must rise in its value hierarchy, if our species is to survive in an 
increasingly hostile environment. The greater the density of the population, the 
complexity of the condition, the scarcity of the resources and the danger of the 
situation; higher the demand for consideration and the narrower the margin for 
unilateral action. 
 The implication of this hypothesis means the increasing centrality of 
morality. Although human nature desires a polyvalent multi-value coexistence, as 
a result of human actions, it is presently necessary to put greater weight on 
ethics for the sake of our collective survival.  
 This does not mean completely negating other vital values. The 
fundamentalist belief in any single supreme value leads to fanatic and dogmatic 
behavior, which even if momentarily advantageous, is eventually conflict 
generating and ultimately catastrophic. Even life itself may not be worth living 
under any and all circumstances. So, as it happens, attempts to impose one value 
above all others are not sustainable and eventually fail.  
 In any case, an immoral society whose members behave egoistically, without 
any concern for others, does not and cannot exist. A social system, by 
definition must establish lasting bonds among its values and its members. If 
these ties are not mutually considerate, they can only be utterly selfish or 
ideally saintly. Either way, there is no such real system outside heaven or 
hell.  
 Although all societies are somewhat corrupt, they do operate on generally 
accepted moral principles. Apart from ideal utopias or dystopias, actual 
societies are maintained by some combination of values. The problem is that 
behavioral decisions are made individually, whereas their cumulative effect 
affects society collectively. Thus the individual search for survival may lead 
to collective suicide, as the parable of  “the tragedy of the commons” so well 
illustrates. Similarly, collective survival may demand individual sacrifices, as 
the present global situation indicates. 
  Here we introduce politics as the optimal option of individual-collective 
complimentarity. As ethics is a dialogical virtue, politics is a dialectical 
one. This means that political action tries to resolve social conflicts by 
mutually compromising and synthesizing opposing views. In doing so it relies on 
negotiations in good faith between those involved. 
  As elaborated in the study of sociopolitics, the political process of 
negotiation and accommodation complements the ethical process of consultation 
and consensus, As politics modulates impractical moralizing, ethics attenuates 
unprincipled rationalizing, thus making politics and ethics close relatives of 
the same social family. 
 This dilution of ethics with politics makes for the only realistic 
concoction most appropriate for the human condition. Even in a state of nature 
where the so-called law of the jungle holds sway, widespread life and death 
competition is moderated by some group cooperation. Similarly, human societies 
combine ethics and politics as their unique mixed strategy of optimal survival. 
 Although macro history may not show such optimality, the world has 
survived so far: a fact that implies the existence of some ethics in a global 
scale. Moreover, it also indicates a distinct progress by the increasing and 
spreading consultation and negotiation activities among formal and informal 
actors. As a result, the contemporary world ethic abhors unilateral actions and 




widely conducted on the basis of this rule.     
 So much so, that this ethical principle is now enshrined in international 
law. In this case, legality and morality coincide to a great extend. Whereas 
laws are instruments of regulating social conduct under threat of sanctions, 
morals perform a similar function by taking into account implicit motives as 
well as explicit behavior. Even if all moral norms cannot be legally enforced 
nor all political laws be morally applauded, the relation of moral to legal 
conduct remains as strong as the social fabric underpinning it. 
 Such morality distinguishes between the unattainable summum bonum and the 
practical good enough. Humanity needs ideal models of individual sainthood 
without aspiring to utopian standards of collective perfection. This apparent 
contradiction can best be resolved by the minima moralia or lowest common 
denominator of universal values as expressed here. So, in spite of the 
difficulties and ambiguities of moral life, an agreement for this simple code of 
civilized conduct of congenial coexistence is presently within the grasp of 
humanity. 
 Resolving the conflict between personal and collective duties is possible 
by recourse to the natural responsibility that underlies both. As such, global 
neoethics includes ecoethics whose dual value is reverence-responsibility 
towards nature as well as culture. A new morality is thus needed for human 
survival because of evolutionary imperatives. We cannot destroy nature without 
destroying culture as well. 
  The result reflects a high regard for the values of frugality (grace 
without waste); diversity (rich complexity of life) and equity (balanced 
distribution of goods). As Aristotle put it: wealth belongs not only to one who 
has much, but also to one who needs little. So do ethics, we may add. 
 Under conditions of uncertainty such as today’s, faith in the wisdom of 
tradition is highly recommended. In this respect even hypocrisy, that great 
invention of civilization, serves a moral purpose by determining the price that 
vice pays to virtue. So, social prudence demands a dialectical synthesis of 
ethics, physics and politics as the optimal combination of existential reality. 
We must therefore conclude that Aristotelian phronesis along with logical taxis 
and rational praxis are jointly the best criterion of neoethics. 
 This ends the discussion on the application of ethics in the contemporary 
world. The conclusion that politics is the most civilized way to practice 
morality in a social setting should not be surprising, given the close affinity 
between the two activities. Similarly, our cost-benefit calculus showed the 







 It should be evident by now that this study presented a general 
reformulation of ethics by defining, elaborating and applying the various 
aspects of this concept, thus showing the possibility, necessity and 
desirability of morality in human affairs. This immense task was managed by an 
abstract methodology by which the two antithetic views of ethics that have 
confronted each other throughout history were merged. 
 As a succinct summary to the preceding discussion, the tabulation of the 
nine questions posed and the answers given here is presented below. The table 
serves as a synoptic index of the study itemizing the main concepts employed in 





NINE ETHICAL PARAMETERS 
 
 
 QUESTIONS   ASPECTS   ANSWERS 
 
 What is the essence? Action Content  Considerate Conduct 
 
 Who is the subject? Principal Actors  Human Beings 
 
 Where is it found? Scope Context  Organic Society 
 
 
 Whence it arises?  Genetic Origin  Conscientious Intent 
 
 When appropriate?  Operative Conditions Mutual Concern 
 
 Why desirable?  Functional Purpose Sustainable Coexistence 
 
 
 How is performed?  Model Method  Dialogical Consultation 
 
 How much it costs? Price Worth   Value Moderation 
 
 Whether necessary?  Alternative Options Political Compromise 
  
 
 On the basis of this outline, we can now draw the final conclusion 
emerging from the dialectical synthesis reflected in the PEP hypothesis which 
may be reformulated as: M3 = f (P, E, p); meaning that Modern Macro Morality is 
a function of Physics, Ethics and politics. That is to say: the quality of EGO 
depends on the degree of ethical consideration-consultation of ego-alter, plus 
on the life-death, order-chaos parameters of nature and the proper combination 
of control-creativity, reason-power which human culture can inject into the 
whole system. 
 Consequently, the cosmic order of physics overlaps with the legal domain 
of politics and the logical code of ethics to form the neomorals of EGO. Of 
course, the operationalization of such complex function requires much more study 
than was possible here, since it is quite probable that we deal with 
indeterminate correlations that have neither definite nor definitive solutions. 
In spite of that inconclusiveness, a more rigorous treatment of the subject such 




 This treatment combines both traditional relativism and post-modern 
contextualism with neoclassical naturalism. As the thesis contends that ethics 
attains its practical context only within individual and collective experience, 
the antithesis counters with an ethical rationalism of general and eternal 
principles. Accordingly, it contrasts particularism (tribalism, nationalism, 
culturalism, collectivism) with universalism (constitutionalism, 
cosmopolitanism, humanism, individualism).  
 The reemergence of instinctive traditionalism is a reaction to isolating 
individualism and standardizing cosmopolitanism by raising concerns for 
rehabilitating moral sensitivity, strengthening group attachment and rejecting 
ethical atomism. As such, they are understandable sentiments that must be taken 
into account in any search for global supracultural ideals. 
 Beyond ideals, autonomous individuals or nations are motivated to 
cooperate when they perceive their interdependence and realize the potential for 
mutual benefit as a result of collaboration. For this reason, the neoethic of 
enlightened realism accepts the present critical situation of both the physical 
earth and the political world. As a result, it promotes a global morality as the 
only way to guarantee human survival and sustainable development by bringing 
civil law into harmony with natural law. Thus the classical “social contract” 
should be supplemented by a global “natural contract.” 
 It is by now evident that political systems established specifically to 
define and maintain morality have been dismal failures. We must then conclude 
that ethics cannot be arbitrarily legislated or authoritatively enforced, but 
rather developed by tradition and impossed by necessity. Our more modest goals 
should therefore be to improve the acceptable rules of conflict-resolution in 
interpersonal and intergroup relations, thus promoting a sustainable social 
order within the evolving natural environment.   
 In summary, the emerging neoethic is characterized by general principles 
of universal application; simple minimal standards of practical operation; and 
flexible rules of contextual calibration. Such ecocentric bioethic improves upon 
the golden rule by proposing to do unto others what they want done unto them. 
This maxim of enlightened self-interest takes into consideration the alter as 
well as the ego by balancing egoistic and altruistic motives, thereby giving due 
weight to both individual as well as collective rights and duties.  
 The merging of ethical nurture, political culture, and physical nature 
performed here correlates consultation, negotiation and conservation as the 
means of balancing cooperation, accommodation and competition in these 
overlapping realms. Only such trilateral PEP balance respects morality, civility 
and ecology, a combination of which is indispensable to sustainable human 
development in the EGO of this new century. 
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